Estate Tax--Marital Deduction Formula Clause by Barone, Victor Alfred
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
case, however, plaintiff was not suing upon the illegal contract but
was suing for the replacement of a lost deed.
In Hertzler v. Geigley, 196 Pa. 419, 46 At. 366 (1900), the
court stated that if an illegal agreement has in fact been executed
by the parties and the illegal purpose of the contract has been ac-
complished the court will not invade the transaction to discover its
origin. As between fraudulent grantor and fraudulent grantee, title
passes and only creditors upon whom the fraud is perpetrated have
a right to attack the conveyance to have it set aside. Solins v.
White, 128 W. Va. 189, 36 S.E.2d 132 (1945). In the principal
case the defendant was not a victim of the fraud, and he should
not be allowed to point to some prior fraud of plaintiff's as a ground
for not making a new deed.
In the instant case the doctrine of "unclean hands" was rightly held
inapplicable. The fraud in question did not arise out of the matter
in litigation. The plaintiff's cause of action arose out of an occur-
rence separate and apart from the illegal contract. The plaintiff
owned the property absolutely and was not seeking specific per-
formance of a prior agreement. When the defendant delivered the
deed to plaintiff in the prior conveyance title passed. The plaintiff
was seeking some physical evidence of a title which he already had.
The title standing in defendant's name was misleading the public
and would continue to mislead them as to the true owner of the
property until the record title was corrected.
Fred Adkins
Estate Tax-Marital Deduction Formula Clause
Testator provided by a clause in his will that should his wife sur-
vive him, she was to receive a bequest equal to one-half the value
of his adjusted gross estate, after deducting all debts, funeral, and
administration expenses. Iis executors deducted the administra-
tion expenses on the estate's income tax return, which in turn in-
creased the actual value of the adjusted gross estate for estate tax
purposes. Executors computed the wife's share on the basis of the
higher adjusted gross estate and accordingly claimed a higher
marital deduction in the estate tax return. Commissioner rejected
the executor's marital deduction figure and set the amount passing
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to the widow at one-half the adjusted gross estate less administration
expenses, which in turn lowered the marital deduction allowed
to the estate and resulted in an increased estate tax. Held, affirmed.
The express language of the will limited the widow's share to a sum
that was less than the maximum marital deduction available. Em-
pire Trust Co. v. United States, 64-1 U.S.T.C. § 12,219 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
The principal case is an example of the difficulties confronting
the estate planner in attempting to obtain the most benefit from the
marital deduction which was introduced in 1948 INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2056. Briefly, this section has the effect of enabling a
decedent to give up to fifty per cent of his adjusted gross estate
tax-free, if the gift is to his (or her) surviving spouse. It is im-
portant to note that the deduction is not an automatic one-half
of adjusted gross estate; it simply may not exceed that amount.
Within that limitation, the deduction is equal to the amount of prop-
erty actually passing to the spouse, with the further qualifications
that it must have "passed" within the meaning of the Code, and
otherwise qualify as a "deductible" interest. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 2056. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (1963).
The problem presented to the estate planner is to find a way
to insure the maximum marital deduction will be obtained while
retaining other tax advantages-assuming, of course, that the client
desired to make a bequest to the spouse at all. If the spouse re-
ceives more than the maximum deduction permitted, the excess will
be subjected to a second tax at her death to the extent she has
retained the excess, whereas if the bequest was less than the max-
imum allowable, the testator's estate would accordingly lose that
much of the deduction benefit. Committee, Estate Planning and
the Marital Deduction, 102 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 934, (1963).
CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 793-95 (3rd ed. 1961). To take full
advantage of the marital deduction and yet maintain most other
benefits available, the actual wording of the will must be the guide-
line. One choice for the drafter is to simply make a "specific
dollar" bequest in an amount equal to one-half the qualifying prop-
erty, but the obvious drawback here is that estates will vary in
nature and value during the period between the execution of the
will and death of the testator. To prevent the arrangement from
becoming unbalanced, periodic reappraisals and changes in the will
would be necessary. Sargent, To Each His Own, 93 TRUSTS AND
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ESTATES 933 (1954); 7 T.C.Q. 214 (1963); Durand, Planning
Lesson of T.C.Q. 232 (1963); 64 DICK. L. REv. 425 (1960).
Because constant revision is considered impractical by most attor-
neys in this field, the majority use a formula clause in the will which
provides for an automatic adjustment of the property and thus
maintains the desired balance, even though the estate changes. The
formula clause is worded so that the gift to the spouse is just large
enough to achieve the maximum deduction. Cox, Types of Marital
Deduction Formula Clauses, 15 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 911
(1957); Committee, op. cit. supra.
The formula clause, although it may be more practical in many
cases, also has its disadvantages and critics. Trachtman, Leaping
in the Dark, 93 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 932 (1954); 7 T.C.Q. 183
(1963). First, if it is to be sound the formula must take into
account all foreseeable possibilities, and in the drafter's concern and
desire to provide for the future he may say too much. The principal
case illustrates a formula clause which, perhaps inadvertently lim-
ited the bequest to less than the maximum deduction. Had the will
simply provided for an amount equal to one-half the adjusted gross
estate as computed for federal tax purposes, the widow would have
received more and the corresponding deduction would have been
the maximum in this case.
A more specific criticism of the use of a formula clause, and
which is also involved in the principal case, arises from the possibil-
ity that the amount of the widow's share can be affected by certain
elections available to the executor. Trachtman, op. cit. supra;
STEPHENS & MLuR FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX (1959);
LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX (2nd ed.
1962).
To understand how the executor could cause the bequest to fluc-
tuate requires first an explanation of the term "adjusted gross estate."
Briefly, it is gross estate minus deductions for administration ex-
penses, debts, taxes and certain losses. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ § 2053, 2054. However, section 642(g) of the Code gives the
executor the option to deduct administration expenses and casualty
losses from the estate's income tax return instead of from the gross
estate. If the executor takes this option, the adjusted gross estate
is accordingly increased, and one-half of the increment, in turn,
would be added to the bequest. Committee, op. cit. supra; Tracht-
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man, op. cit. supra; 35 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 158 (1960). In the
principal case, the executor contended that his election to claim the
expenses as an income tax deduction increased the adjusted gross
estate and in turn increased the widow's gift and the marital deduc-
tion. The court admitted that this reasoning was correct but the
express language of the will prevented its application, because the
testator provided that the wife was to receive one-half of the
adjusted gross estate "after deducting . . . administration expenses."
This case and others before it have well established that the executor
can affect the bequest by his election. In re McTarnahan, 202
N.Y.S.2d 618 (Surr.Ct. 1960); In re Inman, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369
(Surr.Ct. 1959); Matter of Levy, 9 Misc.2d 561, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16
(Surr.Ct. 1957); REv. RUL. 55-643, 1955-2 C.B. 386.
Another objection raised against the formula clause, by Tracht-
man, op. cit. supra, was that the formula could give rise to
construction proceedings, and courts might construe the clause
in a different manner than the draftsman intended. It could be said
that construction was a factor in the instant case; the court de-
clared that it refused to read the clause as if the words "after
deducting . . . administration expenses" did not exist. It was em-
phasized that deductions would be strictly construed against the
taxpayer, even though the testator probably intended to claim the
full deduction.
In the controversy between non-formula versus formula clauses,
it is admitted that neither method will produce the desired tax
results unless through estate planning is behind the final draft of
the will. To use a non-formula provision creates the risks and
impracticalities involved in maintaining close watch over the estate,
and making necessary adjustments in the will to allow for subse-
quent changes. Durand, op. cit. supra; Trachtman, op. cit. supra;
Sargent, op. cit. supra. Reliance on a formula clause also has its
risks. In addition to pitfalls previously mentioned, Trachtman and
Durand suggest others of importance: the formula could be left
with nothing to adjust if more than the desired deduction passes
through non-testamentary means; the clause must consider possible
effects of the widow's right to renounce the will; and, of course, a
subsequent change in the law could affect the formula.
Sargent, although an exponent of the formula, suggests that if the
situation permits, the formula should not be used. Such a situation
would exist when the attorney is given ample time to write the will,
and the client has an exact inventory of all assets, is familiar with
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tax problems, and will be available for later conferences. However,
if the attorney has little time for periodic reviews of his clients'
estates, or if the occasion demands that a will be drawn up immedi-
ately and the client is vague on property values, then Sargent sees
the formula as the appropriate solution.
Victor Alfred Barone
Federal Jurisdiction-Citizenship in a Class or
Entity Action
D, United Mine Workers of America, entered into an agreement
with X, Anthracite Mine Operators. D was to collect royalty pay-
ments on each ton of coal produced by X and place it in a health
fund for anthracite coal miners. P, representing 23,000 of these
miners, brought an action demanding judgment for all the delinquent
royalty payments not collected. The class of persons P represented
lived mostly in Pennsylvania. The principal office of D was in
Washington, D.C. The action was based on diversity of citizenship.
D moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Held, motion granted.
For jurisdictional purposes the citizenship of an unincorporated
association is determined by the citizenship of its members. Almost
one-fourth of the members of the United Mine Workers lived in
Pennsylvania. The representatives of the class lived in Pennsyl-
vania. Because some of the parties plaintiff and defendant were
citizens of the same state there was no diversity of citizenship.
Nedd v. UMW, 225 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Penn. 1963).
Some states allow union members to bring a class suit. West
Virginia is one of these. Milan v. Settle, 127 W. Va. 271, 32 S.E.2d
269 (1944). Other states allow unions to bring a suit as an entity.
This is the situation in the principal case. PA. R. Civ. P. 2153(a).
The federal courts have apparently adopted the view that the citizen-
ship status of the union is dependent on whether a class or entity action
is brought. When a union is sued in a federal court the citizenship
of the union is that of the individual members of the union if the
union is sued as an entity. Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 189
F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1951). Thus if X, a citizen of Pennsylvania,
sues Z union as an entity and Z union has 99 members that are
citizens of West Virginia and one that is a citizen of Pennsylvania
there is no diversity of citizenship because one of the parties plaintiff
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